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The cost of transportation from the point of manufacture to the
point of sale is a matter of concern to both shipper and carrier; but it
means one thing to one and another to the other. Again, both buyer
and seller are concerned, but to one it is a shipping cost, and to the
other it may be cost of raw materal or stock in trade. Controversies
between these parties may arise, but as between shipper and carrier the
problem is what freight shall be paid, while as between buyer and seller
it is, who shall pay the freight? These different points of view, however, do not necessarily make the questions themselves distinct.
The public, too, has an interest both in what freight shall be paid
and in whether it need be paid at all. Today we describe this interest
roughly as one in "minimizing wasteful cross-haulage" (a crude
characterization, if the public interest actually penetrates below the
surface matter of total national expenditure) ; a century ago, Lincoln
put the matter somewhat more pithily in classifying all human endeavor as "productive" and as "waste effort" 1 (and thus all people
as producers and as parasites). Transportation, under his scheme,
was waste effort, at least if it involved carrying coals to Newcastle.
Lincoln fashioned this point into a rather plausible argument for a
protective tariff system; but even those unimpressed with that argument may go along with his premise that there is no ultimate benefit,
* In two parts.

Part II will be published in a later issue.
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1. See 1 SANMBuRG, THE PRAIMIE YEARS 394 et seq. (1926). In the recent campaign against cross-haulage, the Wheeler Bill of 1936 (S. 4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.)
was one of the leading efforts, though unsuccessful. The various acts relating to the
Interstate Commerce Commission, notable the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 STAT.
436) also reflect this policy.
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ceteris paribus, in expenditures to carry over great distances what can
be obtained from points nearby the destination.
The transportation cost problem has here been selected as one
example of the numerous economic problems clothed with a public interest. It may serve as a useful medium for an approach to the
broader question of whether there is consistency in governmental
policy in attempts to manipulate the national economy. The example
above indicates the imperfect view of such a large problem which
may be gained by one concerned with only one narrow aspect of the
field; it may be postulated, however, that a national government
should take a sufficiently broad view to develop a policy of long-range
consistency and significance. As the title of this study suggests, however, government may become such a large beast that one arm may
act not only independently of another, but in actual conflict with the
long-range objectives of the other. It is purposed to examine here
that tendency in the treatment of the problem of transportation costs
by our Federal Government, and especially the question whether the
Supreme Court has in any degree reconciled the conflicts arising in
administrative policy. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission were selected for parallel treatment, not
only because they are the two largest and most important agencies
(though certainly not the only ones) dealing with transportation costs,
but also because they have both recently carried important litigation in
the field through the Supreme Court, and these cases, handled by
substantially the same Court personnel, may, considered together,
throw some light on the question whether the Court approaches the
work of individual administrative agencies as facets of one broad
public policy, or as unrelated contests between citizen and state.
The work of the I. C. C., dealing with the transportation companies as public utilities, has been grounded on the broad question
of whether they have earned the money they charge, and has emphasized the distinction between such a utility and an entrepreneur with
the inherent right to profit unlimited. On the other hand, the F. T. C.,
unconcerned generally with the measure of profit, has considered transportation charges as costs, and as such as only one of several elements,
unimportant except insofar as they may be used as means of oppression or discrimination by a seller against a buyer, or as they may be
the cloak of subterfuge by a group of sellers, acting in concert, to
oppress buyers or competing sellers.2 The significance of the amount
2. The best discussions of the I.C.C.'s handling of transportation costs are in
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1937), especially vol. 3,

SHARFMAN,

and

(as to interterritorial freight rates, under discussion here) "Interterritorial
See also, for narrower phases

FreightRates", 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 391 (1947).
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of transportation charge, or of where this burden falls, may naturally
vary in these two contexts. There is no direct conflict, however, until
the two agencies commence, intentionally or inadvertently to manipulate the same economic problem, as appears to have occurred in the
attempts of the I. C. C. to adjust the relative economic status of the
various regions of the country, through the regulation of freight rates,
and in the probably unintended effect on the same matter of the
F. T. C.'s campaign against basing-point prices. Of course it is for
Congress, which creates these agencies and defines their powers and the
scope of their interest initially, to reconcile such conflicts as they
arise, but it is a thesis of this article that in the absence of Congressional adjustment it is also for the Supreme Court to develop and give
expression to a consistent formulation of the underlying public policy,
as a basic judicial function.
PART I: THE I. C. C. VERSUS THE ZONE FREIGHT RATE:
A STUDY IN TERRITORIAL SUBSIDY
"Was du ererbt von deinen Vitern~hast,
Erwirb es um es zu besitzen."
(You must first earn what you inherit from your forefathers, in order then to possess and enjoy it.)
Faust, I, 682-3.
THE ECONOMIC SETTING

Were the South generally regarded as the most prosperous area
in the Country-irrespective of realities-it is to be doubted that any
complaints from there of economic discrimination would carry much
weight, either with public opinion, or with the official agencies created
to regulate the nation's economy, or with others regarding such regulation as part of their function.
However, this is not the case; the South is thought of as a backward, impoverished area. It fell into this state after the struggle which
destroyed its ancient way of economic life; it remained so when its
people failed to find an adequate substitute.' The present continuance
of the question, Tally, The Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and the Freight Rate Battle, 25 N.C.L. REv. 172 (1947). The F.T.C.'s fight against
the basing-point pricing practice has been much more widely discussed, and it is difficult to cite a single definitive treatment. The best starting point is perhaps OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION 964 (1936), which contains a full bibliographical
reference list. The more recent basing-point cases are discussed in articles cited
therein at n. 316.
3. The agrarian economy of the South rose Phoenix-like from its own ashes
after the war, to be agrarian still, though its typical habitus has been prostrate, as its
own members say, or supine, as it may seem to others. See on this tendency HACKER
AND KENDRICK, THE U.S. SINCE 1865 (4th ed. 1949); Bucx, THE GRANGER MOVEWENT (1913) ; SmELLIE, THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1928).

128

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

of this state is demonstrated by statistical surveys, emphasizing particularly relative concentrations of industrial ' wealth and prevailing
wage levels, and even to a degree by analyses emphasizing populationindustry density and wage level-cost of living ratios. 5 It is demonstrated by historical and sociological studies, and in song, story and
(low be it spoke) drama.
The relative poverty of the South being a publicly received and
deplored fact, and being laid at the root of so many evils of nationwide import, it is natural that any event or situation tending in any
degree to redound to the economic disadvantage of the South will be
regarded with intense suspicion and criticism. One such whipping-boy
is the cost of transportation, which has been cited for some time as a
principal offender in the retarding of Southern economic growth.6 The
charge has been the basis of an amendment of the regulations controlling our national economy, and this suggestion has resulted in litigation at several points, and has been adjudicated in the Supreme Court.
It is presently purposed to examine this adjudication from a policy
viewpoint. First, however, the elements of the case for the Southern
representatives must be stated, as a foundation for description and
criticism of what the Court did.
To any Southerner not in the transportation business, of course,
low railroad rates would be desirable. The advantage to the consumer
is obvious, though freight rates bear only indirectly on the cost of living and hence with him are not a burning issue. From the business
point of view, however, freight rates are not only important, but if they
are, or appear to be, unduly high, they are an obvious thorn in the side.
As rates charged Southern shippers have been, or have appeared to be,
consistently higher than those charged in the North ever since railroad
4. As distinct from agrarian or natural-resource-based wealth.
5. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH (1943) ; CLASS RATE INVESTIGATIONS, 1939, 262 I.C.C. 447 (1945), especially

536 et seq.; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1939); T.N.E.C, HEARINGS ON INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcoNomic PowER, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1939).
See on recent proposals for Federal subsidy to education, also, Editorial,
The Boston Herald, 2 May 1949, and news report, The Boston Herald, 31 August
1949, of remarks of Republican Leader Baldwin of Connecticut concerning subsidy
by Federal funds of states which offer tax exemptions to attract industries to move
from non-subsidized states.

6. See Time, May 26, 1947, p. 30, col. 1; Fortune, Freight Rate Battles, October
1944, p. 49; Business Week, Sept. 25, 1943, p. 24, col. 2; id., May 26, 1945, p. 17,
col. 1; id., June 16, 1945, p. 120, col. 1; id., Dec. 8, 1945, p. 22, col. 3. Among the
technical studies relating to the problems were three T.V.A. Surveys: Interterritorial

Freight Problem of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 264, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937); Supplemental Phases of InterterritorialFreight Problem, H.R. Doc. No.
271, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934) ; Regionalized Freight Rates, Barrier to National
Prodictiveness, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See also Report
on InterterritorialFreight Rates, H.R. Doc. No. 303, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943)
and VOGTLE AND KLINE, FREIGHT RATES OF THE SOUTH (1943).
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operations became a matter within the province of The Interstate Commerce Commission sixty-odd years ago, there has been throughout that
time more or less political pressure from the South for an adjustment
in its favor.7 During much of the period the Commission simply did
not have rate-regulation powers, 8 and even when it acquired general
rate-fixing powers it was at best a dubious question whether they would
extend to an adjustment for the benefit of a section of the Country
rather than as between specific shippers and carriers.9 It was not until
a decade ago that an amendment to the statutory language emboldened
representatives of Southern shipping interests to precipitate the fight
for a territorial rate adjustment in the Commission."0
A typical argument for rate change runs about as follows: during
the post-Civil War era of rail expansion, rates were fixed according to
what the traffic would bear. But during that time the South was
politically and economically weak, and rates fixed in that area by Northcontrolled railroads were aberrantly high. When rail rates became
the subject of Federal regulation, the status quo was taken as the
starting point, existing rates being presumed proper and the burden
placed on those urging change. With this handicap of history and
impetus in their favor, railroads have conspired, in effect, ever since,
to continue the regional oppression of the South by discriminatory
rates. Something should be done to change this situation. 1
There were variations in the pattern and in the emotional intensity
content, in proportion to history and reason, in these arguments, but
the theme was constant, and it wanted only a leader to crystallize
7. Business Week, September 25, 1943, p. 24, col. 2; id., May 26, 1945, p. 17, col. 1.
8. These were first granted by the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 584 (1906), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1946). In practice, however, rates have commonly been
fixed by rate bureaus and conferences of the railroads with Commission approval.
A good brief summary description of this practice appears in Business Week, October
6, 1945, p. 24, col. 3.
9. The sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379, §§ 3, 4 (1887), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (1946), have been the subject of much amendment to
clarify this point, but different Congresses have meant different things, and conflicting
case interpretations have further obscured the point. The Hoch-Smith Resolution, 43
STAT. 801 (1923), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 55 (1946), the "port" clause, 49 STAT. 607
(1935), and the Ramspeck Act, 54 STAT. 899 (1940), are the more important legislative amendments. The Lake Cargo Coal Case, (101 I.C.C. 513 (1925), 126 I.C.C. 309
(1927), 139 I.C.C. 367 (1928)) rev'd sib twm. Anchor Coal Co. v. U.S., 25 F.2d 462
(1928), is a leading example of definition of those provisions by case decision. See
also MANSFiELD, THE LAKE CARGO COAL RATE CoNTRovERsY (1932).
10. The Ramspeck Resolution, 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1, 8, 12, 13, n.
1001 (1946), was a part of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 899. The Commission had actually started its own investigation, leading to the case under discussion
in 1939, but it may be questioned whether it would have gone so far as it did without
the Resolution.
11. See Time, May 26, 1947, p. 30, col. 1. The argument is there represented as
antediluvian in origin and usage. See also comments in Newsweek, April 9, 1945, p.
68, col. 3, and Time, April 9, 1945, p. 82, col. 2, relating to the then pending Arnall
case.

130

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Southern thinking and to register it on the sounding-boards of national
public opinion. Such a leader offered himself in Governor Arnall of
Georgia, and the debate of two generations and more reached the
judicial forum five years ago, culminating at last in The State of
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 2 This action was designed to establish the principle that the I. C. C. must take into account considerations of interterritorial economic balance in establishing rates, rather
than judging them simply by the test of reasonableness as to the individual shipper in relation to the return to be earned for the carrier
by its total traffic.
Another case, New York v. United States,' collateral to the
Arnall case, and with an independent result, has largely taken the steam
out of the Arnall proceeding. The latter is not rendered moot, but
much less is at stake than before New York v. United States, where
it was held that the I. C. C. may properly take into account broad territorial effects of rate levels, and may adjust rates in a manner calculated to achieve interterritorial economic parity. The difference between this decision and the Arnall case lies chiefly in the difference
between "may" and "must", and so long as the I. C. C. adheres to its
present policies is an academic distinction. It will here be assumed,
then, that the South has won in New York v. United States the chief
citadel of its objective, leaving only mopping-up needed for complete
victory. It is then purposed to examine here in some detail just what
New York v. United States did for Southern freight rates, and the
soundness of the result.
THE

I. C. C.

AND THE FIXING OF RAILROAD RATES

The rate charged by a railroad for any shipment is the price of its
service: that is, it represents from the railroad's point of view cost plus
profit. As railroad entrepreneurs may be presumed in the bulk of instances to have built their roads from human motives of profit rather
than from any response to an inner call to public service (which may
have been controlling in the exceptional case), one might expect rates
12. 324 U.S. 439 (1945), holding that Georgia has standing to bring the suit. See
text at note 158 infra.- The latest development in the case was the filing of a report
by the Master, on June 12, 1950. There has been no official report on the filing of this
Master's Report, as the Court was adjourned for the Summer on June 5, and no action
has been taken on the Report, but newspaper reports are fairly complete. See e.g.,
New York, Herald Tribune, June 13, 1950, p. 4, col. 4. The Master, Lloyd K. Garrison, found that the railroads had violated the anti-trust laws by improper practices of
the type alleged, but found that plaintiff had failed to establish the economic injury
complained of, and recommended dismissal of the case.
13. 331 U.S. 284 (1946). The best comment on this case is in the foreword to
Interstate Freight Rates, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 391 (1947). The articles therein

were written before the decision in the instant case but are impressively complete on
the underlying factors.

THE GOLDEN EGGS

to have been calculated to produce the maximum return-that is, set at
what the traffic would bear. Under such a set-up it might be expected
that rates would sometimes be high, in areas of high demand and low
supply (absence of competition in service), and that discriminations of
various sorts might be practised where it was advantageous for the
railroad to do so, whether by inequalities of rates between different
shippers, by inequalities between localities, or by rebates. Further,
the business being one in which a large initial capital outlay, and perhaps some political aid, was required in the organization phase, it was
peculiarly adapted to the growth of monopoly or to a sanctioned cartel
14
organization and control.
These same things were true of many other types of business in
the post-Civil War period; but it was against the railroads that the
political wrath of those injured by overbearing business practises was
first turned. 5 Why this was is hard to explain precisely, although a
plausible and conveniently elliptical statement is that the railroad business was "tinged- with the public interest," and hence became classified
as a public utility, subject to special governmental controls in fixing its
rates as well as in certain other matters.'"
14. See BucK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT (1913) ; BUCK, THE AGRARIAN CRUSADE

(1920); HicKs, THE POPULIST REVOLT (1931); T.N.E.C. op. cit. mtpra note 5.
15. See CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS c. 2, 3 (1941),
for an interesting treatment of the legislative backgrounds of the Interstate Commerce Act. The matter is also treated in 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMISSION (1931).
16. Just when a business becomes touched with a public interest, the assumed
factor in this statement, remains elusive. Such businesses are easier to define by
specific cataloguing than by general categorizing. Inns (that is, hotels and restaurants), common carriers (public transportation business, except intercontinental surface
carriers), purveyors of pipe or wire-conveyed heat, light and water for the home, and
communications business (telephone, telegraph, and radio) are touched with the public
interest. The catalogue is not historically fixed in detail: airlines and radio stations
have fallen into the category of utilities as they assumed large proportions. On the
other hand, vendors of food, clothing, solid fuel for the home, and vehicles, lessors of
living quarters, and furnishers of medical, dental, and tonsorial services are not touched
with the public interest. The dividing line breaks down in the case of banks, insurance
companies, accountants, investment and realty brokers and exchanges, and lawyers,
so that it is sometimes' difficult to tell whether a given activity is regulated as a "public
utility" or under some otherwise-derived power. Size and tendency to monopoly do
not control, as the contrast between inns and steel manufacturers will show. Neither
does, apparently, the essential nature of the commodity or services involved, nor the
fact that services rather than commodities are sold. A combination of characteristics
is suggested by the listing above, as a means of probing the meaning of "tinged with
a public interest," though not as an infallible test in application to specific cases. In
general, the public utility is a business which must typically be large to survive or
to be profitable, and which deals directly with a great many customers in small individual transactions. The steel company deals with large customers, or in large transactions, and not directly with ultimate individual consumers; this is not true of the
railroad or the telephone or electric company. Further, the fact that services and not
commodities are dealt in, and that it would be wasteful and unprofitable for all affected
to have enough concerns engaged in the business to produce free competition (whether
because of the size of the business, or because of the necessary use of public facilities,
as in the case of waterpipes or streetcar lines) may be strongly indicative of a "public
interest" in a particular business. The legal literature in this field has not, organiza-
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Transportation companies, such as canals and turnpikes, were
freely subjected to public regulation during the nineteenth century, but
the controls exercised were directly applied by the legislature, so that
political manipulation Was a definite possibility, and in the case of
railroads public policy was at first set toward generosity and liberality,
to encourage the expansion of rail transportation for the exploitation
,of undeveloped areas and resources. This made it possible for overbearing business practises to become sufficiently widespread and unpopular to be a serious political concern and a matter for special and
continuing attention.17 In this setting arose the modern regulatory
commission as a legislative device for exercising closer, continuous,
and more nearly expert control than had been previously possible. First
was the investigatory and advisory commission, in Massachusetts
(1869) and other eastern states, and later the more powerful regulatory
commissions, in Illinois (1871) and other midwestern states."" Two
thirds of the states created one or the other type of commission during
the twenty years following the Civil War, 9 but it was apparent that
for efficiency's sake Congress should exercise the Federal power over
this type of commerce, and thus create controls uniform throughout
the Country. What was not so obvious, however, was the precise type
of control which should be exercised.
Congress debated several legislative proposals for commission
control of railroads during the period 1878-85,2" and the present Interstate Commerce Commission, the senior federal independent administrative commission, was created in 1887.21 Pursuant to the recommendation of the leading authorities on rail regulation, the new commission was of the advisory rather than of the regulatory type.22 This
was changed in 1906 by the Hepburn Act, the first major amendment
tionally, taken adequate note of the developments of the past decade and a half. The
best general treatments are POND, PuBLic UTILITIES (1932), and a briefer survey
from a non-technical viewpoint, NASH, THE EcONOmIcs OF PUBLIc UTLITmIES (1925).
17. Authorities cited supra notes 14, 15. See also 2 HANEY, CONGRESSIONAL
HISTORY OF RAILWAYS IN THE U. S. (1910), covering the period just prior to 1887.
18. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 20-34; 1 SHARFMAN, op. Cit. mrpra note
15, at 13-19.
19. Of thirty-eight states then in the Union, fifteen had an advisory type commission, and ten the stronger type of commission, with rate making powers. See
CUSHMAN, op. cit. sopra note 15, at 25-6.
20. See HANEY, op. cit. sitpra note 17; CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 40.
The principal bills were the Reagan Bill (1878) and the Cullom Bill (1883).
21. 24 STAT. 379 (1887). This and the amending acts are all in 49 U.S.C. passim.
See I SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 19-34, for a discussion of the Act of 1887
prior to the Elkins Act of 1903.
22. CUSHMAN, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 27 et seq., discusses the arguments as to
which type of commission was more desirable. In addition to the cumulative effect of
remarks of such leaders as Chauncey DePew, the most effective argument for the
advisory type commission was probably that made by C. F. ADAMS, JR., in his RAILROADS: THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMfS (1878), at 133 et seq.

THE GOLDEN EGGS

to the original Act,2

3

which gave the Commission for the first time the

power to prescribe maximum rates prospectively.2 4 Though there have
been some significant changes, the law of railroad rate regulation dates
almost entirely from the Act of 1906.25
All that has been said rests on an assumption of plenary legislative
power to regulate in this field; and the legislative police power is, in
fact, adequate for the general purposes of regulation. Two limitations
of a Constitutional nature have touched the Interstate Commerce Commission.2 6 One of these, the proper extent of delegation of legislative
power to an administrative tribunal, combining legislative, judicial, and
executive functions, is common to all administrative agencies, and need
not be discussed here2 T The other, however, the Due Process Clause
of the 5th Amendment, goes to the essence of the rate-fixing power, in
its admonition that rates must not be so low as to be confiscatory, and
in the procedural minima flanking the administrative process. 28 The
question of procedural due process is incidental here, but a more general
background on the prohibition of confiscatory rate levels may be useful.
The general standard for administrative rate-fixing is that the
rate must be "reasonable". "Reasonable", from the point of view of
the shipper, or of the shipping public, means that the rate must not be
exorbitant, or so high or unequal as to amount to a substantial deprivation or reduction of service. "Reasonable", from the point of view of
the carrier, though, means that the rate must not be so low as to deprive
the owners of the carrier of a "fair return" on the capital they have
invested in the enterprise; and it is in support of this requirement that
the Due Process Clause has been more than once invoked.
In making calculations under this latter standard, two elements
are necessary: the percentage rate of return considered fair, 29 and the
base amount to which the rate is to be applied. The fixing of the base
for calculation of "fair return" has involved not only some accounting
problems in valuation, 0 but also considerable controversy as to what
23. This Act (see note 9 supra) effectively changed the I.C.C. into the "strong"
type commission. See 1 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 40-52; CUSHMAN, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 65-81, with a good summary.
24. See id. at 70 et seq.
25. E.g. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 STAT. 539; The Transportation Acts
of 1920, 1933 and 1940, 41 STAT. 456, 48 STAT. 211, 54 STAT. 899, 49 U.S.C. passivi

(1946).

26. Others, concerned chiefly with the scope of the Commerce Clause, may affect
different agencies, and there may be special problems in determining the powers a
state commission may properly exercise.
27. See generally GELLHORN, ADmINIsTRATIvE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 60
et seq. (2d ed. 1947) and authorities there cited.
28. On these procedural minima see id. and HART, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADmINIsTRATvE LAW pt. 5 (2d ed. 1950). On the rate level and its requirements, see 3
SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION c. 13, 14 (1936).
29. 3B id. c. 14 §§ 1-7.
30. 3A id., especially at 68 et seq. and 97 et seq.
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the valuation yardstick should be: original cost (actual investment),
reproduction cost new (a standard important to the owner, at least, in
case of casualty loss), present market value (difficult of application to
such items as capital assets of railroads), or, more popular with the
modern Court, the amount prudently invested by the owner.3 This
latter standard ignores the present economic situation of the owner, or
at least may ignore it; it substitutes the Court's hindsight for the investor's original judgment, faith, or daring; and it introduces a new
imponderable-the definition of "prudence"-into the rate base calculation; but it has, nevertheless, largely replaced other rate base standards
in the railroad rate law of the I. C. C. and the Supreme Court. 2
The Rule Against Territorial Discrimination
The power to regulate rates has been applied not only to prevent
excessively high rates, but also to prevent "discriminatory" rates.
Several provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act are directed to this
general purpose, one forbidding differing rates for the same services,3 3
another barring a lower rate for a given haul than that charged for a
lesser included haul (the "long and short haul clause")." These are,
however, but specialized relatives of a more general provision, whose
scope might well be considered to include both the others. This general
provision makes unlawful rates resulting in undue or unreasonable
preferences of or prejudices to persons, points, or localities."3
The rule against territorial discrimination involves in its administration the balancing of a number of complex and sometimes imponderable factors. The same factors may influence the determination of what
is preference or prejudice, and again of what is "undue" under the
statute, so that in a loosely-reasoned case some may be given more and
some less than their relatively-justified weight.
The factors which have been taken into account in determinations
of prejudice have been principally:
31. 3A id. at 130 n. 57, 141-3, 148-9, and authorities cited. The doctrine appears
to have started, judicially, with a separate opinion by Justices Holmes and Brandeis
in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
"Value" is an elusive concept, however, and has produced some of the finest discriminations in the law. The lay mind does not readily accept these and other nice distinctions involved in the rate making process, and there is a tendency to regard some of
them as sophistry.
32. This seems to have been accomplished as a part of the process of transmutation of early dissents by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo into law when a
majority of the Court was obtained, willing to regard earlier cases as precedents only
so long as supported by weight of numbers.
33. Section 2.
34. Section 4.
35. Section 3.
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(a) Whether the difference in rates charged is justified by a
proportional difference in the cost of furnishing the service;
(b) Whether the shippers charged the rates are in competition
with one another, so as possibly to be affected by the
difference.
In addition, in determining whether prejudice (or preference) is "undue", consideration has been given to:
(c) Whether the shipper paying the prejudicial rates is actually
injured by the difference, and
(d) Whether such shipper would actually be aided by the removal
8
of the discrimination.
The cost differential which may justify corresponding rate variances may be based on distance, but other factors, such as traffic density,
terrain, and terminal facilities will also play a part in the picture, so that
37
the calculation of this factor alone may be far from a simple matter.
Again, in determining whether a shipper has been injured by a rate discrimination, the actual prosperity or even the relative welfare of the
shippers concerned will not be entirely controlling, so that the Commission if it will consider this factor may find itself confronted with an
unrewarding exercise in tracing causation and in determining what
causes are proximate."8 If factor (d) can be determined, of course,
that will be helpful in answering question (c), as they are closely related; but to admit this is somewhat to limit the number of factors
actually relied on. In determining factor (d) it is noted first that
a discrimination may be removed either by lowering the high rate or
by raising the lower one, and the question is then asked, would the
prejudiced shipper be relieved by the latter type of adjustment? If he
would not, then his complaint becomes, if valid at all, solely one of
exorbitant rates condemned by Section 1 of the Act. 9
In addition to the problems involved in determining the factors
listed above, the question arises whether some of these may not be inconsistent with each other or with those which must be considered
primarily by the Commission under the Constitutional requirements
of due process, mentioned above. There is no necessary conflict in the
case involving individual shippers, as the standard of reasonableness
36. 3B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 542-70.
37. 3B id. at 559, and authorities cited in n. 422.
38. See particularly Accme Mills v. A. G. S. R. R., 136 I.C.C. 1, 114, 118-121

(1927).
39. 3B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 563 and authorities cited in his notes
at 429-30.
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will be so related to cost in individual cases as to determine the matter
of the existence of prejudice, as the injury is manifest, even if not
critical, where prejudice in shipping rates is present (not all cases have
adopted this solution, however). But in the case of alleged territorial
discrimination the chain of causation through cost to carrier and cost
to shipper is so tenuous as to lead the Commission to rely heavily on
factors (c) and (d), and then the problem is, if questions (c) and (d)
are to be considered, what if they suggest answers not consistent with
that indicated by (a) ? Will this inconsistency create a Constitutional
flaw in the Commission's action? Is the Commission going beyond the
length of its statutory chain and engaging in extra-jurisdictonal activities, if it attempts to determine, and by its action to influence, broad
interterritorial economic relationships? 4 These are the questions
underlying the superficial problems of procedure and reasoning suggested by the Supreme Court opinion in New York v. United States,
and it is proposed to return to these questions after a consideration of
that case.
The Organization of the Rate Systems Under the Act of 1920
The first post-war Congress, in 1919-20, faced the fact that the
American railroad economy was in poor condition, and the Transportation Act of 1920 was its answer to the problem. It was an excellent
time for a fairly extensive new deal in railroad legislation, for the roads
had been under Governmental control and operation during the War,
and as legislation was needed for the return of the railroads to private
ownership, the breaking-off point from a wartime to a peacetime basis
of rail operation provided a convenient starting point for needed major
adjustments.
The really new departure in the 1920 Act stemmed from the fact
that rail revenues had, for the previous decade, been insufficient to provide a decent return on invested capital, and attempts to secure rate
adjustments to remedy this situation had been inadequately dealt with
by the I. C. C., which owed under existing legislation no duty to consider the railroads' needs, in addition to the public interest, in fixing
rates. The need for remedial legislation was universally conceded, and
the Transportation Act of 1920 was as a consequence perhaps the most
popular of the various acts which have gone to build the railroad regulation structure. 4 '
40. See § 6 of the Act. This problem is discussed infra.
41. This fact may have averted or delayed criticism of some of the Act's provisions, which they might otherwise have been thought to merit. The labor provisions,
for instance, were more than a dtecade ahead of the time when they would have been
sure, standing alone, of popular approval.
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The answer which the 1920 Act provided was contained essentially
in its rate provisions, including the notorious "recapture clause", and
in its provisions for consolidation of existing rail lines."
The rate provisions of this Act imposed on the I. C. C. an affirmative obligation, implementing the Constitutional requirement mentioned
above, to fix rates at a sufficiently high level to afford rail investors
a fair return on their capital, and further to review the rate structure
in the light of the welfare of the railroad economy, as a public interest,
rather than confining itself as theretofore with interests of the public
against exorbitant or discriminatory 43 rates.
Of equal importance, especially in relation to the territorial organization of the Country for freight-rate classification purposes, were the
provisions for consolidation of competing rail lines. These provisions
recognized that enterprises as large as railroads are as unsuited to
engage in free cut-throat competition as are elephants to prance the
minuet. A part of the ills of the rail economy, particularly in financial
structures, lay at the door of uncontrolled competition of businesses too
large to fight in the arena available. The resultant statutory instructions to the I. C. C. to work out a plan of consolidation of competing
lines adopted a principle of controlled competition-not of the "chosen
instrument", but of the chosen gladiator. In each territory there was
to be competition, but competition limited to a chosen few.
Under this statute, plans were prepared by the Commission at a
leisurely pace, finally producing a plan in December 1929 which closely
paralleled that used in the freight rate classification scheme. Under
the latter, freight rates are fixed within territories according to two
classifications. The first is a broad division of the Country into three
territories; " while the second is a more detailed breakdown into eight
territories.45
Under the consolidation plan, twenty-one major systems were
approved, it being contemplated that these might cannibalize other lines
42. Other important provisions dealt with labor problems, service, state interfer-

ence with interstate commerce and rail security issues.

43. The "fair return" provision was phrased in terms of "the Country's railroad
investment" and the so-called recapture clause was in furtherance of the recognition
of a national interest in the railroad transportation system. It was designed to bolster
up the weaker roads by providing a Robin Hood-like "take from the strong, give to
the weak" fund derived from excess earnings recaptured from the stronger roals.
This approach toward railroad socialism was, however, a dead letter, and was later
repealed.
44. The Eastern (east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio-Potomac line),
the Southern, and the Western.
45. New England, Trunk Line (New York-Baltimore to Chicago-St. Louis),
Southern, Southwestern and Northwestern (both west of the Mississippi and east of
the Rockies), Central Western (the Mississippi to the Pacific), and Anthracite and
Bituminous (both specialized short-line territories).
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but not each other, as the twenty-one were grouped into areas of competition: two in the New England territory, five trunk line systems,
three systems in the South, two Canadian-owned groups, and nine
Western systems.

46

This broad pattern has been amended, and pressures are met from
time to time for further amendment, but it still underlies Commission
thinking and action on such divers matters as rate regulation and security transfers. But there have been times when the pastures on the
other side of territorial fences have seemed greener than those closer,
for shippers, and this has built, ultimately, political pressures for readjustment of the territorial boundaries, system alignments, or the rate
schedules within the parallel rate classification territories. These
movements have been especially vigorous in the South, under the impetus of previous resentment against the railroads, and provided the
immediate background of the litigation culminating in the case of New
Yark v. United States, whose history will now be examined in some
detail.
NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES:

AN

ANALYSIS

In 1939, of its own motion, the I. C. C. instituted two investigations into the legality of the freight rate classifications and class rate
relationships throughout the Country.4 This investigation was given
added impetus by the Transportation Act of 1940,48 which added the
words "region, district, territory," to the section barring territorial
discrimination, 4' and authorized and directed such an investigation
as was already in progress, for the purpose of determining any relative
injustice in the rates in their relation to each other, and of removing
any such unlawfulness by appropriate orders."°
The rate structure disclosed by this investigation was difficult to
define, as the "normal" classification system was heavily cut into by
exceptional cases, so that only about 6 per cent of the total freight traffic
moved under "normal" class rates, 51 and the rest mostly under "excep46. Grouped again into more directly competing areas in the northern, central,
and southern portions of the territory.
47. See Class Rate Investigations, 1939, 262 I.C.C. 447, 454 (1945). See also
264 I.C.C. 41 (1945), supplementing the original report.
48. 54 STAT. 899, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1946). See 262 I.C.C. 447, 689 for the
relation of the 1939 investigation to this statute.
49. Section 3.
50. This Act also created the Transportation Board of Investigation and Research,
whose Report, published in 1943, generally agreed with the substance of the I.C.C.
report supporting its adjustment order two years later. The Board's vote tended to
follow geographical lines, and thus expressed the Southern position in the controversy,
together with some conflicting conclusions by way of dissent.
51. 262 I.C.C. 447, 479 (1945). See also 331 U.S. 284, 307 (1946).
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tion"

2

or "commodity" 13 rates, the latter being also exceptions to the

usual classification, established for particular commodities. 4 A classification system which was so subject to economic pressures as to hold
good for only 6 per cent of the traffic carried was obviously somewhat
unrealistic, and did not fairly represent the actual criteria for rate payment, but the I. C. C. did not attack it from this point of view. On
the theory that other types of rates represented deviations from the
norm, and that the first step was to adjust that norm, the Commission
confined its study and order to the "normal" classification, and to class
rates, leaving commodity and exception rates out of the picture for the
time being. This case, then, is concerned only with class rates under
the basic classification system, that is, with the rates covering about 6
per cent of the total traffic. 55
Class rates were made up, it was found, by grouping everything to
be carried into about thirty classes, and then fixing a rate for each
class. 6 These classifications varied in different rate territories, so that
a given item might fall in one class in the Official Territory classification, and in another under the Southern Territory classification. What
was of more concern, as the case developed, was the differences in rate
levels for the different classes of articles, among the five territories now
existing.5 7 The Southern average, for instance, was 137 per cent of
the Official Territory average on the first class " and in the other territories the rates ranged from 129 per cent to 160 per cent.5" It was
to eliminate these inequalities that the Commission's order was
intended.
The position of the railroads has been that the rates they fixed,
with Commission approval, have been based on unit cost of carriage,
and that the higher unit cost in territories where traffic density is thin
and terrain is difficult has justified a higher rate: that is, that to insure
a uniformly fair return to the railroad investor, rates must vary in
different parts of the Country. Further, a higher point-of-origin rate
in Southern and other territories is justified, it was said, by the low
52. 262 I.C.C. 447, 562 (1945).
53. Ibid.
54. A fourth type of rate was the column rate, closely resembling the commodity

rate. Ibid.

55. This figure varied between territories, and was actually only 4.1 per cent,
tonnagewise, for the entire country, but as between Southern and Eastern railroads,
6 per cent was taken as a fair average. The figures were also not complete for all

territories. See note 44 mipra.

56. Though such a rate existed only on paper if lower commodity or exception
rates covered everything in the class, as frequently happened.
57. Official, Southern, Western Trunk Line, Southwestern, and Mountain Pacific.

58. Other classes being rated at percentages of the first.
59. 184 per cent under the Transportation Board report.
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volume of use of terminal facilities there.6" The Commission found this
justification not to exist, or at least not to justify, sufficiently, the
difference. Southern ton-mile costs, it was said, were actually less
than those in the East. 6 ' The actual background of the difference,

according to the Commission report, was historical. The railroads
grew up as feeders for the waterways, and were thus bounded by them,
and no better reason than this lay behind the territorial boundaries
which separated even the large rail lines. The Eastern economic territory, further, grew up first, and became strongest, and able to effect
more favorable rate bargains than could the industrially undeveloped
South and West."
The corrective plan adopted by the Commission contemplated a
uniform country-wide freight classification system,6 patterned on the
Official classification, to replace the three previously in use.64 Under
this classification, rates were to be equalized, ultimately, at 115 per cent
of the previous Official rate levels. 5 This would bring Eastern rates
up 15 per cent, and Southern and Western rates down different
amounts, as much as 37 per cent in some cases.66
The uniform rate classification was not a great task, as there was
about 60 per cent uniformity already, and only 13 per cent differing in
all three systems. 7 The rate level adjustment was a serious matter,
though, as freight generally accounted for two-thirds of the railroads'
operating revenue, and class rates covered some of the items producing
the highest relative profit." To allow time for adjustment in such an
area, an interim order was entered, for a flat 10 per cent class rate cut
in all but Official Territory, and for a 10 per cent raise on intraterritorial hauls in Official Territory, and a 10 per cent cut on hauls out of
Official Territory.6"
Suits were brought by some of the railroads affected, but principally by the states in Official Territory, to set aside the interim
60. 262 I.C.C. 447, 591-2, 642-88 (1945), passim; 331 U.S. 284, 314-5 (1946).
See e.g. Dickson, Full Cost Basis for Competitive Rates Favored, 116 RAILwAY AGE
515 (1944).
61. 262 I.C.C. 447, 591 (1945).
62. Id. at 619 et seq., p. 512 et seq., passint. See also report, TRANSPORTATION
BOARD OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARcH

(1943).

63. 262 I.C.C. 447, 509-12, 699-702 (1945).
64. The Official, the Southern, and the Western, used in three rate territories.
65. 262 I.C.C. 447, 701-2 (1945), and appendices cited.
66. Mountain Pacific rates were not affected, as coast-to-coast exception and
commodity rates were already so favorable as to rule West Coast shippers out of the
rate fight.
67. 262 I.C.C. 447, 468-71 (1945).
68. WORLD ALMANAc 443 (1948).

supra note 6 and infra note 71.
69. 262 I.C.C. 447, 702-7 (1945).

This point was stressed in news reports, cited
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order; o this suit indirectly also affected the permanent adjustment, as
it went in part to the power of the I. C. C. to issue such an order as was
done here, and in part to the sufficiency of the justification for the order
in the investigation and findings in this case-again touching the support for the permanent as well as for the temporary adjustment.
The District Court for the Northern District of New York, in
71
which the suits were brought, sustained the Commission's orders,
and appeals were taken to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
judgment below. 72
The Court's own opinion justifying its decision rested it on substantially the following points:
a. The I. C. C. has power under existing law to regulate rates to
eliminate interterritorial discrimination.7"
b. In this case the I. C. C.'s findings, (1) that interterritorial discrimination existed, and (2) that it was economically prejudicial to the South, Midwest and Southwest territories, were
74
adequately supported by the evidence.
c. The I. C. C. finding that the rate discriminations were not
justified by differing railroading conditions in the different
territories was also supported by the evidence.7"
d. In spite of some inconsistency the temporary reduction order
76
as to less-than-carload class rates should not be set aside.
e. The I. C. C. order increasing Official Territory rates 10 per
cent and reducing those in other territories was proper even
77
though Official Territory rates were previously reasonable.
A discussion in some detail of the reasoning behind each of these
points seems indicated.
The Power of the I. C. C. to Eliminate InterterritorialDiscrimination
This question must be divided into two components, as must any
question of the power of an administrative agency:
70. A collateral question, not here discussed, concerns the states' standing to contest the order in court. See Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action, 49 Cot. L. Rav. 759 (1949).
71. 65 F. Supp. 856 (N.D.N.Y. 1946). See also newspaper accounts in the N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1946, p. 29, col. 8, May 11, p. 34, col. 3, May 19, p. 10, col. 5, May 28,
p. 33, col. 4.
72. Sub nom. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1946).
73. Id. at 296-300.
74. Id. at 301-315.
75. Id. at 315-332.
76. Id. at 332-40.
77. Id. at 340-51.
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(1) The question whether there is statutory authority under the
Commission's enabling legislation for the regulation; and
(2) Whether any power so granted will if exercised transgress
the constitutional boundaries to administrative or governmental authority.
The majority opinion and Justice Jackson's dissent were divided
primarily on the existence of the legislative basis of the powerassumed sub silentio in Justice Frankfurter's dissent. The principal
point of discussion as to the existence of power was the Ramspeck
resolution of 1940, directing the Commission to remove any unlawfulness "which may be found to exist in respect to unreasonable rates
discriminating against any region, district, or territory". 78
The majority held that the Ramspeck resolution merely enlarged
the scope of a pre-existing section. The Interstate Commerce Act, they
held, has always aimed to eliminate discrimination against localities.
The Transportation Act of 1940 added the words "region, district,
territory" to the previous anti-discrimination section along with instructions to the Commission to investigate existing rates and eliminate
unlawfulness in interterritorial rates. The Commission acted under
this resolution to remove interterritorial discriminations found in existing rates, "if not justified upon proper consideration of recognized
elements of rate making applied in the light of the amended law," as
unlawful.79 The new words added by Congress in 1940 "made plain"
the duty of the Commission to consider territorial rate problems and to
eliminate differences "which are not justified by differences in territorial conditions"."0 This was merely a clarification of the statute,
rather than a modification.
However, it must be noted that the Commission never openly indicated that the rate changes would have been lawful prior to 1940.
On this it hedged."' And Mr. Justice Jackson's position was in essence
that there was no power given in any statute to raise rates in one territory merely to eliminate territorial competition. The 1940 act, he
argued, made no change in the laws that previously stood, and debates
indicated clearly that Congress did not believe that power existed to do
what the Commission here did. Therefore, at least as to the increase
78. Id. at 297.
79. Id. at 299; 262 I.C.C. 447, 692 (1945).
80. 331 U.S. 284, 298-300 (1946).
81. It is unfortunate in some ways that disagreeing groups in the court are not
required to resolve their difficulties by a procedure something like the common law
pleading system, as otherwise their arguments may sometimes pass one another like
skew lines, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. The majority say, "This is good because of reason a," and the minority "This is bad because of reason b," and the two
run forever on these paths without ever meeting or committing the majority on the
soundness of reason b or the minority on the soundness of reason a.
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ordered in2 Northeastern rates, the Commission lacked power to support
its order.

8

It cannot be denied that from the earliest days of the Commission's
history there has been concern over rate discrimination against locali83
ties as well as discrimination against individual shippers or carriers.
That this concern had been a part of the philosophy of the Commission's regulatory work under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act is indicated by
language in the reports of the Commission as early as the 1890's."4
The existence of the problem as an evil in rate making was also judicially recognized well in advance of the 1920 statute. Yet other evidences should be borne in mind which reduce the scope both of proper
regulation and of power to regulate by placing them in context. First,
note the ambiguity of definition in any one of the several terms in the
simple statement of the Commission's power. Second, consider the
breadth of the word "unreasonable". In the language of the Commission itself there is an indication that some discriminations may be justified "upon proper consideration of the recognized elements of rate making applied in the light of the .

.

. law", 5 and in the language of the

majority opinion relating to territorial differences in rates "not justified
by differences in territorial conditions." 86 But these qualifications on
the Commission's power are nowhere explored in either opinion. It
is perhaps best to conclude that the Commission and Court majority
are right in finding the existence of power to regulate against territory
rate discrimination if they mean "power to regulate properly," and that
Justice Jackson is right in his dissent in finding absence of power if
he means "power to regulate improperly". The failure to resolve the
difference as to the precise scope of the Commission's power merely
transports the problem to the consideration of the propriety of the instant exercise of the power, and means that in considering the orders
here entered the requirement of Commission power must be satisfied
in addition to those of accuracy of findings and reasonableness of
remedies adopted. 7
82. Id. at 360-1.
83. 1 SHAPFMAN, op. cit. .rpranote 2, at 18, 21, 198 (citing the committee report
submitting the McCullom Bill).
84. 12th ANNUAL REPORT, I.C.C. 23 et seq. (1898). See also SHARPMAN, op. Cit.
mipra note 2, at 198, n. 42.
85. 262 I.C.C. 447, 692 (1945).

86. 331 U.S. 284, 300 (1946).

87. That the power has always had generally recognized limitations is indicated
not only by the senatorial language quoted by Justice Jackson's dissent, but also by
the almost universal condemnation of what was attempted to be done in the HochSmith Resolution of 1925, which attempted to derive through Commission regulation
of rates an adjustment of the general level of the agricultural economy. There is a
striking parallel between what was sought to accomplish in that resolution with reference to one cross-sectional segment of the national economy and what was done in this
case as between the sectional elements of the economy. See on the Hoch-Smith
controversy 1 SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 227 et seq., 223-4 n. 95.
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The Conclusion of the Court as to the Existence of Economically
PrejudicialTerritorialDiscrimination
Here is a problem of review of administrative findings as to the
sufficiency of the supporting evidence. The Commission, of course,
was relying heavily on so-called typical evidence,"8 and on the latitude
which an administrative Commission may have in determining legislative as distinct from adjudicative facts.8 9 The procedure of the Commission, as to the technical character of the evidence relied on, is not
open to criticism within the framework of the existing law. But always in an attempt to arrive at any conclusion, legal or otherwise, of
fact or of law, there must be a reliance on premises which logically
sustain the conclusion in question. The evidence relied on by the
majority of the Court as sustaining the factual conclusions of the Commission seems to fall somewhat short of that standard, and should
therefore be examined in a little more detail.
The evidence in this case was in great bulk, much of it in the form
of statistical tables, compilations, and analyses. That which was considered important by the majority of the Court, can be summarized
as follows:
(a) Class rates on shipments originating in Official Territory are
materially lower than those on shipments originating in other
territories. 90
(b) Classifications are different in all territories, and in the
majority of cases these differences add to the burden differential carried by shipments originating outside Official Territory. 91

(c) A very small percentage of total carload traffic is actually
carried at class rates, as exceptions and commodity rates
have largely swallowed up the business. 2
(d) Official Territory is more prosperous than the other territories, on the measures of number of gainful workers, value
of manufactures, average annual income, and relative con93
tribution to the national industrial economy.
88. See GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-CASES AND COMMENTS 536 n. 5 (2d
ed. 1947) ; SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMIssloN 376 et seq. (1931).
89. See Davis, An Approach to Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARv.
L. REv. 364 (1942), especially at 402 et seq.
90. 331 U.S. 284, 301-5 (1946).
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 306-7.
93. Id. at 310-14; 262 I.C.C. 447, 619 (1945).
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(e) The decrease in employment of class rates has been the result
of competitive forces.94
(f) During the ten-year period preceding the Commission's investigation there was a marked decline in prosperity, according to trends in the factors listed above, in Official Territory,
as contrasted with some increase in the other territories, particularly in the Southern Territory.95
(g) There are many differences in character of terrain, original
concentration of population, availability of natural resources,
and basic suitability for industrial activities, between Official
Territory and the other territories. 6
This evidence was used to support two conclusions:
(1) That territorial discrepancies existed, and
(2) That these discrepancies were economically prejudicial to
territories other than Official Territory.
It is the author's contention that much of this evidence is irrelevant,
or worse, that it leads to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the
court.
If the word "discrimination" is defined without any element of
intent or concerted action, then the existence of discrimination is susceptible of mathematical proof, and the conclusion is but a restatement
of the evidence [ (a) above]. The illegality of the difference presents a
more difficult problem. To this point the other evidence must be
directed.
The conclusion of illegality was reached under the premise that
the discrimination was illegal if it was economically prejudicial. (Note
here that this premise itself presents another aspect of the problem of
power; its soundness must be left open for further consideration in
connection with the validity of the rate orders entered.) The only
substantial evidence of economic prejudice relied on by the Commission and the Court was the evidence that, according to selected scales,
Official Territory was, in 1930-40, more prosperous than other territories. This reasoning appears to reduce itself to the following:
(a) Rates are higher outside Official Territory than in it.
(b) Official Territory is more prosperous than other territories.
94. Id. at 504; 331 U.S. 284, 307 (1946).
95. Id. at 311-12.
96. Id. at 314-15.
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(c)

Therefore the rate differential has operated to the prejudice
of the relative prosperity of the territories outside Official
Territory.

This may not be a fair presentation of the argument without including a premise relating to the general economic effect of shipping
costs. Such a premise could be built into the argument about as
follows:
(a) Shipping costs are higher outside Official Territory than in it.
(b) The level of shipping costs plays a part in determining the
economic prosperity of shippers and of the area in which they
operate.
(c) Therefore the rate differential operates to the economic prejudice of the territories outside Official Territory.
But in this chain of reasoning the relative economic prosperity of
the different territories at any particular time becomes unimportant,
and, further, the Court itself excludes the mere differential as showing
illegal discrimination, as the differential alone must always have some
effect on relative prosperity, though perhaps not a critical one.
It is difficult to say how the mere fact of different prosperity levels
between these territories on a given date can be ascribed to rate discriminations, without something more to tie the prosperity levels to
shipping costs rather than to the many other factors admittedly contributing to over-all prosperity. In the absence of any such connecting
link this item of evidence seems to become irrelevant.
Another block of evidence relates to the general desuetude of the
class rate structure as distinct from commodity and exception rates.
The Court rejected the contention that for this reason any class rate
discrepancy should be disregarded under a de minimis approach, saying
that the point could not thus be put in the scales against the Commission's conclusion, because its real significance is not that the discrepancy under paper rates is slight "but that the rate structure as
constituted holds no promise of affording . .

ment which territorial conditions
concluded that the desired result
in the main was moved on class
class rates as being "the result of
97. Id. at 309.
98. See note 94 supra.

7

that parity of treat-

warrant".
The Commission had
could not be achieved unless traffic
rates, and discounted the disuse of
competitive forces".9.
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A point not developed in the consideration of this evidence is that
in an area where competitive forces are strong enough to nullify a rate
system unpopular with shippers it can hardly be said that those shippers
are suffering a critical economic loss from discrimination under the
rates so nullified. Such an argument might tend to note the evidence
of the disuse of class rates, and work against the Commission's conclusion. But certainly this evidence does not seem to be a very important factor tending in either direction.
It is hard to understand why the Court attached so little significance to the upward trend of Southern economy as against the general national and, in particular, Official-Territory decline. It would
be an extraordinary fact if a region which for a century has been more
sparsely populated and less actively developed should suddenly, within
a decade, attain parity with a region favored by nature and history as
the industrial focal area of the nation. Moreover the very fact that
the difference in prosperity levels, on the selected scales, is ancient,
tends to negative the importance of that difference. The fact that the
trend of the decade during and just following the period of operation of the rates complained of has been so markedly in favor of the
South is definitely evidence tending to defeat the conclusion of the
Commission, and almost if not quite sufficient itself to defeat all the
other evidence cited, even at its face value.
Judicial discretion in reviewing the fact findings of the Commission is of course quite limited; but assuming that the Court should
open the record is far as it did it seems that it might properly have
reached the opposite conclusion on the basis of the materials it took
out of that record.
The Conclusion That the TerritorialRate Discrimination Was Justified by Railroading Conditions Peculiar to the Different
Territories
The Commission and the Court relied primarily on a cost analysis
of the carriers' expenses in making various types of hauls in the
different territories. This evidence was extracted in the Court's
opinion in tabular form, 9 and given at much greater length in the
Commission's opinion in similar form.'
Had it been graphically
presented it seems that some of the curves would have been tended to
support the Commission's conclusion, and some few to defeat it, but
that the great majority would have been entirely inconclusive. In the
99. 331 U.S. 284, 319-24 (1946).
100. 262 I.C.C. 447, 571-91, 609-13 (1945).
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form in which it was presented it created no greater impact, and indeed Justice Frankfurter's dissent was based largely on the inconAs bedclusive character "of the unsifted averages" relied upon.'
time reading this material compares unfavorably for interest with the
paralipomenal genealogies, but the severest criticism leveled against it
is that, on any set of premises, it just does not aid in the conclusions
drawn as to relative haulage costs in different territories. The Court
itself manifested some uneasiness on this point, saying that "these costs
involve many estimates and assumptions and, unlike a problem in
calculus, cannot be proved right or wrong. They are, indeed, only
guides to judgment. Their weight and significance requires expert
appraisal" 102 and "the details of the cost study are too intricate and
voluminous to relate here," "03 and the Commission itself pointed out
that "other factors along with costs must be considered and given due
weight," '

and "discretion and flexibility of judgment .

.

have

always attended the use of costs." 105 That is, in the language of the
Court, "While costs studies are highly relevant to these rate problems
they are not conclusive." 106

It might have been simpler for both Court and Commission to
discount the cost analysis entirely, on Hadley's theory that "not even
God knows how much it costs to transport anything from one place
to another," 107 and start with the proposition that the sum of the costs
of transportation is also the sum of the expenses properly incurred
by the carrier. Then, in the absence of an indication that a given carrier had reported improper items in its profit and loss statements, the
sum of the expenses so reported would be the sum of the costs to the
railroads of the shipments carried by them. Where a railroad operated
across territorial boundaries, there would still be a problem of allocation of total expenses to the various territories, but the railroads involved in this case are sufficiently confined within rate territories to
make the allocation problem negligible. Then the total expenses of the
Southern Railroad during a year will be the total costs of the shipments
carried by it during the year, and the total expenses of the Pennsylvania
101. 331 U.S. 284, 351 (1946).
102. Id. at 328.
103. Id. at 317.
104. 262 I.C.C. 447, 693 (1945).
105. Ibid.
106. 331 U.S. 284, 328 (1946).
107. 3-B SHARFMAx, TnE INTERSTATE COmmERcE CommIssioN 541 (1936) discusses the difficulties in the use of cost analysis. See Hamilton, Cost as a Standard
for Price, 4 LAW & CONTFMP. PRoB. 321, 329 (1937), cited by the Court, 331 U.S.
284, 335 n. 33 (1946). But cf. Amory, in a book review, 2 J. LEGAL EDuC. 112, 115
(1949).
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Railroad represent the total cost of shipments it carried in the same
year. These costs perhaps should be broken down further in proportionate scales and allocated to different types of shipments, as was attempted to be done in the cost study submitted, but any such further
procedure is at best conjecture and not necessary to the purpose at
hand; for the main issue was whether the total costs of carriers in the
Southern Territory were sufficiently higher than the total costs of carriers in Official Territory to justify their generally higher rates. As it
appeared, they were not, and thus the answer shown by the cost study
does not appear to have been misleading; but so far as the sufficiency
of the evidence actually relied upon is concerned, the important thing
is that its accuracy can be measured only by checking it against overall figures not relied upon. 08
Another point of approach to the question would be to ask, must
the rates complained of remain at their present levels in order to be
within the area of reasonableness? If the basic criterion of a reasonable rate is that it must yield the carrier a reasonable return upon its
total value (invested), then the next question might be, if the rate
concerned were adjusted as suggested, would the result be that the
yield on the carriers' investment would fall outside the area of reasonableness? This would be found simply by computing yield against
revenue and expense figures available from actual operating data, and
again on the basis of hypothetical suggested rates, with the maximum
108. If the cost study is relevant at all, as the Court says it is (see note 103
supra) that is, if the total yield and total expenses of the railroad are important in
determining reasonableness, then the validity of the cost analysis rests on the following
proposition:
"If C, + C2 + C3 (costs) -H- E (total expenses), then the cost study (or
report) is inaccurate."
But if C, + C2 + C3 = E ideally, then why not use E, a determinable factor, as
the basis for the legal result?
This same proposition produces disturbing results, again, when applied to the flat
ten per cent cut and raise involved in the adjustment order. Considering the Southern
railroads' ten per cent cut, for instance, the following results:
R (rate) - E (expenses) =-Y1 (yield).
.9R - E = Y 2 ; but although Y 2 is less than Y1, it cannot be said that
Y2 = .9Y.
Ten per cent to the Southern carriers is one thing and to the Eastern another. If
the beginning ratio is 60:100, then adding ten per cent to one and subtracting from
the other, we get 6:9; the ten per cent cut from the one is greater than that added to
the other, and far more than ten per cent off Y, or the rate of return. If this was
calculated in terms of rate of return, even on an approximate basis, it does not appear
from the reports.
What, then, are the proper uses of a cost analysis, under this approach? It may
be suggested, to reapportion costs in determining efficiency factors, or to destroy an
argument made as to total costs sustained. But it was not here attempted to do either.
Without some definition of the function of such figures, they become mere gobbledygook, and the Court's own doubts about them may have been reflected, not only in the
language cited above, but also in its de ninimis argument, discussed below. Such an
approach tends, it seems, to break down the force of the other points on which the
decision is rested.
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and minimum level of yield prescribed by the Commission as a yardstick. The result of this computation would provide a ready answer
to the question of justification for present rate levels.
One or two other points in the Court's discussions of the justification question should be noted in passing. The Court shrugs off the
rule of I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh,0 9 saying the Commission made no
effort in the case "to equalize fortune, opportunities, or abilities," the
thing said by the Diffenbaugh case to be outside the scope of Commission activities."' It is difficult to say whether the Court's position
here means that it does not put its approval on the elimination of territorial discrimination as an end in itself, or that it gives it unqualified
approval and considers the equalization point as a mere make-weight
factor.
The other point is illustrated by the following language of the
Court:
it is urged that without the rate advantage which the
western carriers now enjoy, any comparison which now appears to
favor the western carriers would disappear . . . but we are dealing here with the problem of discrimination-a western structure
which as compared with the eastern is not warranted by territorial
conditions and which prejudices the development and growth of
the West. It would be a large order to say that the renewal of
that trade barrier will have no effect in increasing traffic. The
assumption on which the finding of prejudice is made is, indeed,
to the contrary. Moreover, that argument would protect a discriminatory rate structure from the power of revision granted the
Commission under § 3 (1) by the easy assumption that without
discrimination the carriers would not thrive. But that flies in the
face of history and is contrary to the Commission's expert judgment on these facts."

"'

This language raises a cause and effect problem, whether freight
rates regulate economic conditions or whether economic conditions
regulate needed freight rates. This question raises in turn a more
fundamental point-which may the Interstate Commerce regulate? If
it may regulate only the carriers and their affairs, then it must assume
economic conditions as a given factor, and the granted effect of the
rate levels on those conditions is incidental; if, on the other hand, it is
to regulate economic conditions, then it may consider the reasonable
rate levels as tools rather than as ends in themselves.
109. 222 U.S. 42, 46 (1911).
110. 331 U.S. 284, 315 (1946).
111. Id. at 332.
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The Conclusion That the Order Reducing Less-Than-Carload Rates
Was Valid
Two attacks were made on the order reducing rates for fractional
loads:
(1) That no discrimination had been shown as to such rates, and
(2) That the new rates ordered were confiscatory.
On the first point the Court supported the Commission's order, apparently, for the following two reasons: 112
(a) Failure to adjust fractional load rates with the others would
redound to the competitive disadvantage of fractional load
shippers as against carload lot shippers.
(b) Fractional load traffic affected by the rate order constitutes
a very small portion of total railroad freight tonnage, and in
many cases rates as low as, or even lower than, those ordered
are voluntarily maintained.
The first reason adduced by the Court in support of the Commission's position appears to be susceptible to formulation in about the
following argument:
A. The rate order must be viewed as a whole, from the viewpoint
of the overall objective of eliminating improper discrimina*
tion.
B. To adjust this portion of the rate order would result in a new
discrimination between shippers, not presently existing.
C. Therefore, no such readjustment should be made.
This argument seems to contain an inarticulate refusal to consider
the valid basis for discrimination which may exist as between fractional load shippers and carload shippers. Under the classical laws
of economics, it was true that one who bought in quantity or shipped
in quantity could obtain more favorable rates than one who bought or
shipped piecemeal. This may no longer be true, but it might have
been well had the point been expressly covered in the Court's presentation of its reasoning.
The Court's second point reduces itself to the following argument:
A. The rate order must be considered as a whole, and if its overall effect is desirable then it is not important that some small
component part may, considered separately, operate improperly.
112. Id. at 333-4.
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B. The fractional load rates criticized form only an insignificant
portion of the over-all structure affected by the order.
C. Therefore, minor discrepancies in the fractional load orders
should be disregarded in ruling on the over-all readjustment.
This is, of course, just one way of expressing the de minimis maxim,
or of saying "don't bother us with trifles." Here the Court takes a
position in the de minimis argument which seems inconsistent with
its concern for the effect of the over-all class rate structure as against
commodity and exception rates.
The minor premise of this argument also seems to contain an
internal fallacy on the question of the relative importance of fractional
load rates. It is said that "less-than-carload traffic is less than 2 per
cent of total railroad freight tonnage, and much of that moves, not
on class rates, but on exception rates and commodity rates"; "' but the
total traffic moved by class rates is only 6 per cent of total railroad
freight tonnage, it is found, and thus the fractional load traffic at 2 per
cent would carry one-third the weight of the entire structure affected
by these rate orders. This proposition is illusory, of course, because
"much" of the "less than 2 per cent" moves on non-class rates, but it
can hardly be told whether fractional load rates are relatively important or not, keeping this proposition in mind, without knowing
how much the "much" actually is.
On the point of confiscation the problem again becomes one of
weighing the evidence adduced. The railroads had presented, according to the Court, "elaborate analysis" showing deficits resulting from
fractional load shipments, and the increase in deficits which would result from the Commission's order.114 The Court met this with three
arguments. First, the Commission's expertness must be relied upon in
determining ultimately the rights and wrongs in disputes as to the costrate balance: "like other problems in cost accounting, it involves the
exercise of judgment born of intimate knowledge of the particular
activity and the making of adjustments and qualifications too subtle
for the uninitiated," "' and "the process of rate making is essentially
empiric. The stuff of the process is fluid and changing-the resultants
of factors that "must be valued as well as weighed"," 6 and "now and
then a hardy soul, equipped with simple faith and a calculating machine,
113. Id. at 333.
114. Id. at 396.
115. Id. at 335. This language smacks of the serene attitude of the classical
Sinologue toward his less fortunate fellows.
116. Id. at 335-6, quoting from Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534,

546 (1942).
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essays the adventure of rates based upon the true costs (emphasis
added) of the particular services. The feat, of course, is technically
impossible, for value judgments or empirical rules are essential to the
distribution of overhead." 'IT Second, the railroad analysis of the rules
is not accurate, because providing certain adjustments are made (that
is, under a different computation, subscribed to by the Court) the costrate ratio is quite different from that derived under the railroads'
"elaborate analysis".,"
Third, the Commission has since the rate
order in question granted a major increase in freight rates, so that
"the actual rates chargeable presumably will be increased from the level
fixed by the [interim rate] orders to the level prescribed by the recent
order increasing all freight rates. Thus no loss has been suffered [because of the District Court injunction pending this decision] .
and any loss which would have been suffered .

.

has probably been

at least lessened, if not eliminated, by the general rate increase." 119
In short the Court relies completely on the Commission's judgment
in matters of cost accounting, for they, and not the Court, are the
experts.' 2 0 This might be well enough, if it is recognized that it eliminates the possibility of any judicial consideration of the sufficiency of
evidence to support administrative findings in this field-a rule which
the Court has not cared to articulate. 21 Furthermore, if the Court
desires to include a further conclusive presumption of the correctness
of the expert judgment of the Commission as against those experts
whose testimony might be offered by other parties, that part too should
be explicit rather than implicit.
The Court's second point, above, contains a concealed premise
as to the accuracy of the Commission's analysis as against that of
117. 331 U.S. 284, 335, n. 33 (1946), quoting Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for
Price,4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 329 (1937).

118. 331 U.S. 284, 337 (1946). See also id. at 338 on the fluidity of the Court's
approach to these figures.
119. Id. at 339 (Emphasis added). The use of the word "presumably" may or
may not be taken as a confession of inability to find evidence for the minor premise
on which the court wishes to rely.
120. There is a certain quality of CARROLL'S THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss in
these passages, not only in the "Off with their heads I" aspect of administrative
absolutism, but also in the assumption that mere mortals cannot be expected to comprehend these matters if explained, so it is better on the whole merely to say "It's a
secret I"
121. The antithetical suggestion that administrative findings be given the status
of reports of masters or referees seems never to have been adequately developed. On
the approach to the administrative commission as an "expert court," see Hanft, Utilitics Commissions as Expert Courts, 15 N.C.L. REv. 12 (1936). In the tax field, the
life and death of the Dobson rule may serve as an illuminating case history. See INT.
A discussion of some of the problems raised by
REV. CODE § 1141 (a), (c) (1).
Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), 321 U.S. 231 (1944) before the latest amendments to the Statute may be found in Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange
Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REv. 753 (1944). Contrast the views of a generation past; see Berle, The Expansion of Aierican Administrative Law, 30 HARv.
L. REv. 430 (1917).
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the railroad. But to sustain this there must be enough evidence of the
Commission's superior expertness over the railroads'. Otherwise, it
would seem that the Court has itself fallen into the computing-machine
fallacy which it criticized so extensively.
The Court's third point, that no loss was suffered because of the
subsequent general rate increase, also contains a concealed premise: a
rate order is never confiscatory if it is balanced by another order
restoring the cut, whether the basis of the restoring order is the same
as that of the rate reducing order or not, and regardless of the fact that
the problem dealt with by the restoring order differs from that dealt
with by the order complained of.
The Conclusion That the Order Cutting Rates 10 Per Cent Outside
Official Territory and Raising Them 10 Per Cent in Official
Territory Was Proper
On both counts this order was attacked. It was first suggested
that under previous case law the Commission, having found the existing rates discriminatory, must give the carriers an opportunity themselves to adjust the rates, before letting the Commission impose the
adjustment." As to the order reducing rates in Official Territory it
was contended that the order was illegal unless the existing rates were
unreasonable, as a carrier cannot be compelled to alter a proper existing
rate.

123

The Court met both these arguments by pointing out the nature
of the problem: that here the purpose of the order was to reduce discrimination and not to adjust carrier revenue,1 -4 and that further the
discrimination was not between rates charged by one carrier but between rates charged by different carriers." 5 There was some question
under Texas and Pacific Railroad v. U. S. 126 whether there could be
unlawful discrimination between rates charged by different carriers, but
the Court said that there could, as otherwise "the 1940 amendment
.

.

.

fell far short of its goal.

We do not believe Congress left the

Commission so impotent".
Given that the discrimination is between rates not under the control of any one carrier, then it follows that adjustment could be made
more conveniently by the Commission, as a single agency, than between
carriers who would have to make an adjustment by agreement. But it
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

331 U.S. 284, 340-1 (1946).
Id. at 343-4.
Id. at 341, 344.
Id. at 341-2.
289 U.S. 627 (1933).
331 U.S. 284, 343 (1946).
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is not perfectly clear that the Commission is a single agency which can
conveniently act unilaterally. Can the Commission act without hearing
evidence from all carriers concerned.? Is not this proceeding more
cumbersome than a carrier agreement? Further, the very requirement
that carriers have an opportunity for voluntary adjustment does not
seem in spirit to be subject to a convenience limitation, but seems to be
based on the principle that the Commission should not interfere unnecessarily in a matter that can be adjusted satisfactorily without the
weight of its authority.
The Court, however, excused the Commission from giving the
carriers an opportunity for voluntary adjustment on a different ground.
Here the Commission was acting under a different section of the act,
and this particular order was not subject to the requirement of such
a tender as previously stated.12 The Court's reasoning on this point is
interesting, following about this pattern:
(a) Under Texas and Pacific Railroad v. U. S. the Commission
must give the carriers an opportunity to adjust their rates
if it acts under Section 3, but not if it acts under Section 15.
(b) Section 15 authorizes the Commission to prescribe proper
rates in cases involving discriminatory rates.
(c) Discriminatory rates include rates condemned by Section 3.
(d) Therefore, here the Commission, entering an order under
Section 3, is also entering an order under Section 15, and
need not allow the carriers opportunity for voluntary adjustment.

129

This reasoning comes very close to saying that the Texas and
Pacific Railroad case doesn't really say what it says, but there is no
overt modification or derogation of that case in this opinion.
On the problem as to the reasonableness of the increase ordered
in Official Territory rates the Court points out that both the higher
and the lower rate might well be reasonable, as there is a zone of reasonableness for most rates, rather than a fixed point. 3 0 Therefore,
said the Court, the mere fact that the rates were ordered raised, if it
was for a proper reason (such as abatement of discrimination), does
not render the rate unreasonable even though the previous rate may
have also been reasonable. 3 ' The Court cited previous cases in which
128. Id. at 341.
129. With apologies to the New Yorker, it may be suggested that the spinach
content in this broccoli is inescapable.

130. Id. at 345-8.

131. Ibid.
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rates had been raised even though compensatory so far as the carriers
were concerned, on the ground that they were unreasonable because
they offended other objectives of the Interstate Commerce Act. For
instance, such a rate might be ordered raised to prevent destructive
competition between different carriers. The mere requirement that
rates be compensatory to the carrier is not conclusive, as "if the rates
in Official Territory may not be increased unless the present ones are
shown to be non-compensatory . . -. shippers in Official Territory
could still have a preferred rate . . . not shown to be warranted by

territorial conditions." 132 The Court conceded that such adjustments
could not be made if they would carry the rate out of the zone of reasonable compensation. 3 ' The showing that the rate of return in recent
years favored the Western and Southern carriers appears to be a factor
which, standing alone and given greater weight, might have justified
the result of the case, considering reasonableness of rates from the
standpoint of the carriers alone.
Mr. Justice Jackson's Dissent
This dissent is almost entirely on what he thought improper about
the order compelling Official Territory carriers to raise their rates.
His argument, however, involves incidental disagreement with several
It rests on essenof the other major conclusions of the majority.3
tially the following propositions:
(a) The order compels the railroads in Official Territory to
charge more than is needed to be compensatory.3 5
(b) The establishment of unreasonably high rates in Official Territory amounts to a surtax on Official Territory shippers for
the purpose of handicapping Official Territory economy.'3 0
(c) Such a surtax cannot be justified as an adjustment of discrimination, where the discrimination is based on varying
economic conditions in the different territories, and in reality
amounts to a Government attempt to "reshape the nation's
official, economic and perhaps its political life more nearly
to its heart's desire." 17
132. Id. at 346-7.
133. "We may assume, however, that if the rates of return of the Eastern carriers
were substantially above that for the South and the West, an increase of the rates for
the former would not be permissible, even in order to remove a discrimination." Id.
at 347-8.
134. This and other cases reported in the same volume indicate that Mr. Justice
Jackson may not have been at the time au courant with the current supreme judicial
philosophy-like the Philadelphian who doesn't read the Bulletin.
135. Id. at 364.
136. Id. at 357-8, 363.
137. Id. at 359.
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(d) "No authority can be found in any Act of Congress for the
imposition of this surtax on the Northeast solely to penalize
it for being able to transport goods cheaper [sic] due to its
density of population and volume of traffic." 138
(e) The Act of 1940 "made no change in the substantive law of
discrimination," and any attempt to make any such change is
clearly negatived by the legislative history of the Act.'39
(f) Therefore, the arbitrary increase in rates, being without legislative or constitutional justification, is improper.
A collateral argument is found in Justice Jackson's opinion, to the
effect that the Commission in issuing this rate order deviated from its
legislative instructions as to the character of the adjustments it was to
make.140 These propositions are found in this argument:
(a) The objective of the Commission's 1939 inquiry was not to
adjust rates but to correct the evils in existing freight classifications.
(b) The Commission in this order did not exercise its power of
classification at all, but instead arbitrarily ordered a flat raise
of rates in one territory and a flat reduction in other territories.
(c) Such general raises and reductions leave specific inequalities,
discrimination, and malclassifications unadjusted.
(d) There is no proof of any specific discrimination before the
Court, much less any showing of a general discrimination so
extensive as to warrant a general rate adjustment.
(e) Even though this is styled a classification order, it in effect is
a revenue order, and should not be sustained without the
basis needed for a revenue order.
(f) Therefore, the rate order, not being directed to the evil the
Commission was supposed to correct, and not being valid in
what it does accomplish, should not be sustained.
Mr. Justice Frankfrter's Dissent
This opinion was directed to the character of the proof relied on
by the Commission as supporting its order, while granting the assumption that the Commission had the power to do what was here
138. Id. at 360.
139. Id. at 360-2.
140. Id. at 363.
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ordered, given properly supported findings of fact.
opinion substantially the following points:
(a) The Commission's
showing clearly and
the existence of the
propriateness of the

He makes in his

order must be supported by evidence
definitely the economic facts establishing
discrimination and determining the ap141
corrective action taken.

(b) While there was much evidence before the Commission, some
of which might have supported its order, this evidence has
not been adequately analyzed in the Commission's opinion
142
to indicate just where it places its reliance.
(c) An adjustment order of this magnitude is not adequately supported by the "unsifted averages" adduced by the Commission as justifying it.'
(d) It is extremely doubtful that the flat rate adjustment ordered
is directed specifically to the correction of existing inequalities.'

(e)

There are no adequate findings that the flat rate adjustment
ordered will still leave rate levels within the zone of reasonableness. 45

(f) The adjustment ordered cannot be justified as a tentative
adjustment if it would not be proper as a portion of a per46
manent readjustment.
While this argument is directed precisely at the portion of the
order which offended Mr. Justice Jackson, it will be noted that the
basis of criticism is quite different, resting in one case on a concept of
lack of power and in the other on one of defective procedure in the
exercise of existing power. Justice Jackson says, in essence, "This sort
of thing can't be done under existing legislation." Justice Frankfurter
says, "This sort of thing can be done only if there are sufficiently explicit findings of fact to support the result. The Commission may have
made a proper adjustment, but it has not adequately shown its justification."
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 351-2 et seq.
Id. at 353-4.
Id. at 351-2.
Id. at 353-7, passim.
Id. at 354-5.
Id. at 355-6.
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NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES: THE EFFECT OF THE CASE

A precise evaluation of a case as complex as this must contain an
isolated examination of the separate points considered, but such a
treatment necessarily leads to disjointed criticism, sometimes inconsistent with the conclusion one would reach on another estimate of a
case. Inartistic reasoning may nevertheless lead to a sound result,
through coincidence or through the Court's intuitive perception of the
desired end. To provide some improvement over the kaleidoscopic
view of the individual bits of light seen in the discussion above, it will
be attempted to rearrange them into a mosaic whose pattern may be
less misleading The net over-all effect on preexisting case law will be
considered, and then some attempt will be made to sum up the individual criticisms hinted at previously into an integrated estimate.
The sum of the law of this case and its effect on preexisting law
can be considered conveniently by noting the principal leading cases
which may have been affected, and asking the question, what does
New York v. United States do to each of these cases?
In Georgia v. PennsylvaniaRailroad,'4 7 decided in 1945, the State
of Georgia sued a number of railroads to enjoin rate practices alleged to
constitute illegal discrimination against Georgia products under the
Federal anti-trust laws. The case was heard in the Supreme Court on
the contention that the state of Georgia had no standing to bring such
a suit, and thus that there was no justiciable cause. The Court held
that the suit could be maintained, and it was docketed for further proceedings on the merits, as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court.
Now, four years later, it is still there.
The obvious initial question is whether New York v. United
States renders the Georgia case moot, that is, whether it adds to the
result of that case the substantive determinations which were not involved in what was basically a procedural decision. 4 '
The position that has apparently been taken is that the New York
case does not settle the State of Georgia's controversy, as it does no
more at most than determine that the I. C. C. may, under its enabling
act, adjust rates to eliminate the territorial discrimination of which
Georgia complains, while the object in the Georgia case is to obtain
147. 324 U.S. 439 (1945), 58 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1945).

The case is discussed in

some detail in Tally, The Supreme Court, The Interstate Commerce Commission, and
the Freight Rate Battle, 25 N.C.L. Rav. 172 (1947). This article was written before
the decision in New York v. United States, and its consideration of rate-making policy,
at 184-90, furnishes an excellent reflecting point for evaluating the effect of the latter
case on the former.
148. There were, of course, a few preliminary commitments on what the attitude
of the Court might be on the basis of certain hypothetical showings under allegations
in the plaintiff's bill, but none of these would be considered as decisions on the merits
of a case involving rate law.
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a ruling that such rates must be readjusted under the anti-trust laws.
This difference between "may" and "must" alone would necessitate a
further determination in the Georgia case, even if the difference in the
statutory background would not. New York v. United States provides
a stepping-stone for the state of Georgia and perhaps makes it necessary for only one more step to be surmounted there, but it does no
more, and its result does not necessarily control the substantive result
to be reached in that case.
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling,149 the Commission had adjusted rates of competing water and rail carriers of grain
from Chicago eastward to eliminate the competitive advantage which
barge carriers over the water route had previously enjoyed as a result
of the lower operating expenses required for carriage over those routes.
The Supreme Court held the Commission action in this respect invalid,
saying that the Commission's power to eliminate discriminations and
inequalities did not extend to those resulting from the inherent advantage of one shipper as to cost or efficiency of operation. The fact
that the advantage thus afforded of shipping by water routes resulted
in an ultimate competitive disadvantage to grain shippers without
access to water routes made no difference in this conclusion. The
specific rate adjustments involved in this case were railroad rates: the
Commission had permitted the railroads to discriminate against grain
trans-shipped from barges by charging a higher rate for its carriage
than for grain which had come into the shipping point by rail. The
Court said that the only rate differential which could be justified would
be one based on higher costs of carrying the ex-barge grain due to the
necessity of reloading. There being no adequate evidence cited in
justification by the Commission to relate the rate differential permitted
to the cost factor, the order was improper.
As was pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the
New York case, 5 ' at least the philosophy of the court seems inconsistent with its solicitude in the Mechling case for the preservation of
inherent economic advantages, and its apparent determination to limit
the scope of rate regulation to the area of voluntarily created rather
than of accidentally occurring discrimination. Justice Frankfurter is
concerned with the proof process permitted in New York v. United
States as contrasted with that insisted upon in the Mechling case.
Underlying this, though, is the requirement in the latter case that cer149. 330 U.S. 567 (1947).
150. 331 U.S. 284, 351. The point is also developed, as to the consistency of the
policy implications, in Nutting, Policy Making by the Supreme Court, 9 U. oF PiTr.
L. REV. 59, 62-4 (1947). See 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 546, as to the
Mechling philosophy. There was, of course, also a long-and-short-haul factor there.
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tain things be proved which apparently under New York v. United
States are no longer of controlling importance.
1 the Court
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh,"'
considered the railroad practice of channeling grain shipments through
elevators to keep rolling stock from straying too far from the control
of parent roads. The carriers paid elevator operators at standard
Commission-approved rates for their services in this transshipment
process, and it was found that such payments were received even by
those who were themselves grain shippers as well as elevator owners.
In effect, this meant that such a shipper paid the standard carriage rate,
but was paid at the standard rate for elevator services, irrespective of
the manner in which he accomplished the end result desired by the railroad. It was contended that this amounted to a rebate to the shipper,
at least in so far as a profit over elevator expenses was involved, and
the Commission cut down the rate payable to such shippers to an
amount designed to cover actual elevator expenses only. The Court
held this action improper, saying that "the law does not attempt to
equalize fortune, opportunities or abilities." 152 The rate paid for
elevator services was not attacked as unreasonable, and, including the
reasonable profit allowed, was the same as that which the elevator
operator could get for handling grain other than his own, or that the
carrier would pay to any elevator operator not a shipper. This being
true, any disadvantage to shippers who did not own elevators was due
to their circumstances and not to the contract complained of, and payments under it did not constitute an illegal rebate. The court cited an
earlier case, Penn Refining Co. v. Western N. Y. and Pa. R. R., 15 3 for

the general principle as to undue advantage, but the rule has come to
us through most modern cases in the language of Mr. Justice Holmes,
who wrote the opinion in the Diffenbaugh case.
If New York v. United States means that rates will be adjusted
so that Official Territory railroads must charge more for their haulage
in proportion to the cost to them of carrying the goods involved than
railroads in other territories, in order that shippers in outside territories may have railroad services as cheaply as they can be had in
Official Territory, then the case is inconsistent with the Diffenbaugh
case. But if the New York case merely means that railroads in otheR
territories will be prevented from charging more, on ,a rate-cost ratio,
than Official Territory railroads, and that Official Territory railroads
will be prevented from levying charges on a lower ratio than others,
151. 222 U.S. 42 (1911).
152. Id. at 46.

153. 208 U.S. 208 (1908).
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then the case may be reconciled in result, even if not in attitude, with
the Diffenbaugh case. Which of these two things New York v. United
States means depends on the degree of acceptability of the proofs submitted there, and to a certain extent on an interpretation of the Court's
expression of its basis for action.
In United States v. Illinois Central Railroad.54 a Commission
rate order involved the question of discrimination through joint rates.
It was contended there that the through rates maintained jointly by
two carriers resulted in discrimination against shippers from competing
points from which higher rates were charged. The Court found that
neither favoritism nor malice is an essential element of illegal discrimination under the Interstate Commerce Act, but that the only requirement is that the rate be unjust. It was further determined that a
single rate may properly be found discriminatory irrespective of the
combination of carriers establishing the rate. These decisions were set
forth in cautionary language which was quoted by the majority opinion
in New York v. United States with some apparent misgiving, although
the holding, which would seem to gravitate generally in aid of New
York's conclusion rather than otherwise, was not stressed. The language found important was that "mere discrimination does not render
a rate illegal," but that "it must be shown that [it] .

.

. is unjust

when measured by the transportation standard. In other words
not justified by the cost of the respective services, by their values, or by
other transportation conditions". 55 This language appears to contain
no more than a restatement of the principle running through all the
cases in this field, and emphasized in the language of the Diffenbaugh
and Mechling cases. Whatever the effect of New York v. United
States, it has not strayed so far from this standard as to deny it lip
service.
The other aspect of the Illinois Central case, the holding itself,
seems to provide an intermediate stepping stone between the position
that discrimination results from intentional differences in treatment by
a single agency or as a result of concerted action, and the position that
it can, within its direct and regular meaning, be based to so great an
extent on coincidence as was true in New York v. United States.
Teras & Pacific R. R. v. U. S." is one of the landmarks in the
development of the law of undue rate preferences, and seems to have
suffered the severest damage from the decision in the principal case, although the casualty reports have slurred this fact. The problem there
154. 263 U.S. 515, 44 S.Ct. 189, 68 L.Ed. 417 (1924).
155. 331 U.S. 284, 305 (1946), quoting 263 U.S. 515, 521, 524 (1924).
156. 289 U.S. 627 (1933), 47 HARv. L. RZEv. 494 (1934). See also note 136 supra.
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involved rates from the various points to New Orleans and Galveston.
Although Galveston was much nearer to most of the points of origin
than New Orleans, the railroads had equalized the rates to the two
ports. The Commission ordered a rate spread to eliminate this discrimination, but the Supreme Court held the Commission's order improper on the grounds, inter alia, that there can be no discrimination
resulting from rates not controlled by the same carrier. This proposition seems to have been reworked by New York v. United States.
In each case the problem involved rates set by different carriers,
and in the latter the discrimination was ordered removed, which is what
was said could not be done in the earlier case. Without more, it would
seem that the rule of the earlier case is no longer law. The New York
result could have been reached, perhaps, by deciding that the Texas &
Pacific R. R. case really rested on other grounds. This would involve
stretching a point or two, but it need not now be analyzed in detail,
as the court did not use that approach in reaching its result in the
principal case. What was done was rested on a manipulation of statutory sections, a little difficult to follow.
The Court in New York v. United States limits the application
of the Texas & Pacific R. R. to cases where the Commission directs
individual carriers to remove discriminations, but not to cases where
the Commission acts under Section 1 to require reasonable rules and
regulations of carriers in connection with joint or direct rates, or under
Section 15 to fix new reasonable rates. This process of avoiding the
effect of earlier decisions under the Act by juggling its sections seems
to be subject to the objection that it produces inconsistencies in the
various sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, which should be administered not as a group of independent, unrelated, and even inconsistent individual sections, but rather, under the language of the Court
itself, as an articulated whole, all of whose sections contribute in their
own way to a consistent over-all administration of transportation, leading to parallel results in similar cases. The other objection to this
rationale is that it tends to leave such ancient landmark decisions as the
Texas & Pacific R. R. case standing, not as healthy living trees, but as
hollow shells, liable to fall at any time and injure the passerby who has
7
sought or relied on their shelter.11
157. Commentary on the general subject of consistency in the Supreme Court is
abundant. See e.g., Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues,
34 CoaNELL L.Q. 55 (1948) ; Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis

and Law of the Case, 21 TEx. L. REv. 514 (1943) ; Grinnell, Stare Decisis and the
Supreme Court of the United States, 27 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 183 (1944). For a defensive view see Douglas, Stare Decisis,49 Coi. L. REv. 735 (1949).
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SUMMARY OF CRITICISMS

The criticisms developed herein of the holding in New York v.
United States may be summarized under the following headings.
The handling of precedent. The case appears to involve necessarily some changes in the law of rate regulation under the decisions
reported by the Diffenbaugh case and the Texas & Pacific R. R. case,
even if its result did not absolutely necessitate overruling or modifying those holdings. This process of inarticulate changes of the law is
an unfortunate result of the judicial approach in a Court which pays
lip service to the stare decisis doctrine, but is willing to modify the law
to conform to changing opinions of the public, of those in other
branches of the Government, or if its own members, more rapidly than
is contemplated by the rules of the stare decisis game. If the function
of the judicial opinion is to advise attorneys, potential litigants and the
public as to what they may expect from the court in a particular type
of case, then the guesswork involved in developing information of any
accuracy in cases where, though previous precedent is dead, the court
shies away from the task of writing its obituary, is an evidence of the
failure of the opinion process to perform its designated function. Judicial feelings may recoil at the prospect of justifying the demise of a
well-loved precedent, and equally so at the prospect of following its
dictates, but it hardly seems arguable that the court should be permitted
to flinch at the alternative. The tertium quid has done this Court and
the legal system of which it is the head more harm than good since it
came into common use.
Reliance on the difficulty of making precise judgments in this area

as an excuse for clouded reasoning. Even though the facts justifying
administrative action in a complicated area such as this may be difficult
to ascertain precisely, it seems that the problem is aggravated rather
than minimized by the acceptance of non-conclusive and irrelevant evidence, as seems to have been done in several instances in this case.
Granted that judgments here cannot be advanced with the degree of
confidence that attends the enunciation of a decision based on a rule
of property, it is submitted that for that very reason all the more care
should be taken to obtain the maximum clarity of thought on the
problem and to direct that thought as closely as may be to the center
of the target, in order to be even reasonably sure of an approximation
of the ideally sound result. Certainly the approach of throwing up
one's hands and saying, "we cannot be exactly clear here, so let us only
deal in generalities, approximations and estimates", tends to broaden
rather than narrow the average margin of error to be anticipated.
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Undue reliance on the "expert feel" of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This tendency, manifested even in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Jackson, is perhaps no more than a phase of the problem
just discussed. However, to the extent that it amounts to a judicial
abdication in favor of the administrative fact-finding process, it should
be very carefully worked out in each case, lest the Court surrender the
entire function of judicial re-examination of administrative fact findings for adequacy of evidence, at least in the areas where fact problems
are complicated, without conscientiously thinking through the justification for such a step. If administrative processes are to be absolutely
determinative of individual rights in matters that depend on questions
of fact, or at least so where the true facts are hard to know and understand, then that proposition should be written into our law in large
clear type, rather than being woven inbetween the lines.
The effect of broadening the Interstate Commerce Commission's
Powers. If this decision means that the Interstate Commerce Commission may regulate the welfare of our national economy by adjusting
the handicaps under which competitive processes are carried on, and if
this was not true before the case, or if it was true only to a considerably
more limited extent, then the case is a milestone not only in the law of
rate regulation but also in the constitutional development of our governmental structure, and warrants the most serious consideration before finally evaluating it as a major piece of judicial legislation. Mr.
Justice Jackson's dissent indicates that this is the effect of the case in
part, and excerpts of governmental briefs in the case quoted by him
show that the Government tended to regard the case in this light.15
It is submitted that such a decision reads a great deal into the Interstate Commerce Act, and the points which should have been fought
out, but were not, include not only the question, whether government
should be permitted to regulate economy in this way at all, and whether
the Interstate Commerce power of Congress is broad enough to include
regulation for such a purpose, but also whether Congress had any
such intent in enacting this Act, and if not whether it is at all proper
for the Commission and the Court thus to enlarge the scope of this
exercise of power. This is more than a question of technical constitutional and statutory interpretation; if such power is to be exercised
over broad segments of the economy, is the Interstate Commerce
Commission the proper agency to exercise it? Overt consideration
of these points might raise, for instance, questions of the qualifications
considered in making appointments to the Commission, and whether
158. 331 U.S. 284, 359-60 (1946).
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commissioners are ever selected for their broad potential capacity to coordinate the economic welfare of the Nation as a whole, rather than
merely on consideration of matters bearing on the efficient and equitable
administration of our transportation systems. 59
Not only is there some problem apparent as to whether a Commission such as the I. C. C. should be given such powers as seem to be
involved in this case at all; but also, granted that such matters are
appropriate for adjustment by federal administrative agencies, if this
particular power has not been consciously given to this particular Commission, then who can say without careful thought that the power has
not been given or been intended to be given to some other agency?
Again, if such powers have been conferred by expression or implication
to several agencies in piecemeal fashion, how can the danger of economic disadvantage resulting from the overlapping efforts, perhaps in
conflicting directions, of a number of different agencies without central
co-ordination be avoided? To ask this question is to suggest an answer which need not be labored here. From one aspect or another,
the need for consistency and coordination in governmental economic
regulation is the underlying thesis of this study, to be developed further
in its conclusions.
THE ANATOMY

OF DISCRIMINATION

One of the black words in today's law and today's society is "discrimination". With the unpleasant connotations that have been built
around this word, one way of rendering more forcible the presentation
of a case or the wording of a statute criticizing any distinction in treatment is by the use of the word "discrimination". In many fields it has
become true that when one has once succeeded in characterizing a practice as discrimination, he has half won the battle against the practice.
One of the fields in which discriminatory practices are condemned
is that of rate regulation by public carriers, and the volume of litigation
on the object has served to develop a specialized meaning for the term,
accurate only in this field, so that discrimination now approaches the
status of a word of art in the law of transportation, though perhaps
the scope of the specialized meaning may extend also to some other
aspects of governmental regulation of business. One of the important
aspects of New York v. United States is the contribution it has made
in the development of the meaning of this term. In considering this
effect of the case, it may be well to start with the dictionary meaning of
159. A study of Congressional debates on appointments to the major administrative commissions during the past two years should prove enlightening on both these
suggestions. Categorical conclusions cannot be advanced here.
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discrimination, and to proceed from that to the point which has been
reached in the judicial coinage of the term of art.1 60
Webster gives two principal meanings of the word discriminate
as an intransitive verb.' 6 ' 1. "to make a distinction; to distinguish
accurately," and 2. "to make a difference in treatment or favor (of one
as compared with others)." The applicable definition of discrimination is 4. "a distinction, as in treatment; especially an unfair or unjust
distinction." Taking the discrimination condemned legally as "unfair
or unjust distinction," which seems justified under the cases at least in
this field of law, it may be broken down under this definition and the
normal usage of the term to include the following elements:
(a) Concerted action, or action by a single individual,
(b) Intent (directed at the sufferor from the distinction) and
(c) An abnormal result or purpose, that is, one which would not
result from the equality of treatment taken as the norm.
To these elements the discrimination rule in Section 3 of the Interstate
Commerce Act adds a fourth,
(d) Actual prejudice to a1 62territory or other entity protected
against discrimination.

This may be considered similar to the abnormal result or purpose described above, but it seems that it is not included, as a discriminatory
purpose in the ordinary sense might not necessarily result in actual
economic prejudice.
Under this, it may be taken as the archeozoic discrimination rule
in transportation law that discrimination could not be found without
proof of a discriminatory purpose in the conduct complained of, and
of a conspiracy toward that purpose in any case where more than one
agency is involved in such conduct.
Starting with this rule, an intermediate stage seems to be found
in the rule that any conduct resulting in unjustified prejudice to one
party is discrimination, so that the favoritism or malice factor, (b)
above, is not needed, though a result which is not only prejudicial to
160. The tendency in modern propaganda, international, governmental, legal, and
political, to describe things in black words or white words according to the propagandists' liking or dislike for them-most marked, in this country during the past
decade and a half-is an unfortunate one insofar as the epithet value of the terminology
used tends to obscure the reasoning which may be advanced on either side of an issue.
Cf. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN AcTioN (1939), c. 12, "Affective Communication."
161. 1 WEBsTEP, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 745 (2d ed. 1949).
162. See 3-B SHARMAN, op. cit. supra note 41.
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one party, but also is not based on the relative natural advantages enjoyed by the parties, is still required. This intermediate stage of the
rule has room within its bounds for the Illinois Central Railroad case,
in the indication that a joint rate fixed by two carriers may be discriminatory even though there is no conspiratorial purpose or concerted malice in the action, and it also conforms to the line laid down
by the Diffenbaugh case, recently reiterated in the Mechling case, and
verbally saluted in New York v. United States, excluding results based
on inherent advantages from the category of discrimination.
Even under this intermediate definition, however, a distinction in
treatment between two different shippers by two different carriers
acting independently but not jointly would not be discrimination, as
unified or concerted action is still a requirement under the Texas &
Pacific R. R. case. This requirement appears to have been smothered
dialectically in New York v. United States, so that one clear contribution made by this case to the present-day structure of discrimination is
in eliminating the requirement of concerted action from the definition.
Under this case, then, it becomes discrimination not only if railroad X
treats one shipper less favorably than it does another, or if railroads
X and Y acting together treat one shipper less favorably than they do
another, but also if railroad X., acting independently, treats a shipper
less favorably than another shipper happens to be treated by railroad
Y, operating in an independent and theoretically non-competing territory."° Of course, this places railroad X to some extent at the mercy
of purely business judgments which may be arrived at by railroad Y
with Commission approval or at Commission instigation, and the
factor not only has one aspect of competition involved, but may subject
railroad X directly to the impact of fortuitous economic conditions in
the territory of railroad Y7, unless the safeguards of the results of
natural advantages are carefully preserved and closely examined in
each case. Under the doctrine that result differentials based on natural
advantages are not condemned, but are rather to be preserved, railroad
X would still be permitted to treat its shippers less favorably than the
shippers of railroad Y might be, where Y territory possessed natural
advantages for the operation of an efficient and inexpensive transportation system, such as short distances, a large volume of business, an
ample supply of efficient operating personnel, and a convenient source
of railroad fuel. This doctrine is not reduced by the words of the
majority opinion in New York v. United States, but it may well be open
163. A collateral result of this rule is that a competition concept is reintroduced
into railroad law in a manner at some variance with the philosophy of the attempt in
the 1920 Act to eliminate interterritorial competition and to draw territorial boundaries
accordingly.
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to inquiry whether the practical effect of the case is not to modify it,
in view of the opinion expressed by the minority of the court and by
the minority of the Commission, and in view of the apparent defects
in the proof process approved, to the extent that those defects permit
the Commission to issue such an order as this without a thorough,
painstaking and accurate evaluation of the weight which "inherent
natural advantages" bear in the result complained of. It is at least
open to question whether the doctrine of the Diffenbaugh case and of
the Mechling case has not been reduced in weight, albeit not expressly,
by the decision in this case.
Another point may be whether the decision tends to insert into
the definition of discrimination yet another possible meaning: that
is, that any rate practice which tends to contravene the economic policy
of the Government may be considered discriminatory. This thought
would rest on a premise that whatever economic status or relationship the Government desired should be considered the normal, natural
position of the parties, by definition, so that any practice tending to
alter that position would become, by the same definition, discriminatory. This premise is certainly not articulate in the opinion, nor in
the conclusion; but the insistence of the Government in its briefs and
its administrative action on readjustment of the relative levels of
economic welfare between territories as a matter, pro forma, of eliminating discrimination, and the tolerance with which this position was
regarded by the majority of the Court,164 lends some weight to this
view. The public reaction to the decision did not disclose any general
impression that the term discrimination had any such definition, but it
certainly included the over-all evaluation of the case as a stepping stone
in the campaign for jacking up the relative position of Southern
economy, and specifically as a battle won in Governor Arnall's war for
that purpose. 6 5
If weapons which have been tooled to eliminate discrimination
can be directed toward other regulatory purposes by painting these
latter with the discrimination label, then it should be noted that in
each case the weapon will be aimed at the furtherance of policy
as seen by the particular agency employing it, and as defined in that
particular agency's enabling directives, rather than at any necessarily
co-ordinated policy of the Government or of the people as a whole.
164. 331 U.S. 284, 359-60, 311-14 (1946). See also note 158 supra.
165. See inter alia news comments cited note 11 supra. See also, for a detailed
discussion of railroad discrimination as affected by Georgia v. Pa.R.R., written before
the decision in New York v. United States, but with some discussion of Texas &' Pac.
R.R. v. U.S. and of the Lake Cargo Coal cases, as well as of long-and-short-haul
aspects of the subject, Lake, Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities,

25 N.C.L. REv. 273 (1947).
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tUnless this possibly unintended effect of narrow-scope legislation is
reviewed and the ultimate aims of the economic regulatory program
properly publicized in determining whether specific legislation furthers
them, this particular legal tool may indeed be in the hands of a blind
goddess. Whether the economic end furthered by this decision is the
economic end of our Government, overt or otherwise, can best be considered by viewing the reflection of this decision in the mirror of the
other case to be examined, to see whether the patterns of the two
blend or clash.

(To be concluded)*

* In part II of his study, entitled The FTC Versus The Delivered Price: A Study
in Territorial Isolation, Professor Peairs will analyze the FTC's approach to the
problem of transportation costs and compare it with that of the ICC, with the objective
of determining whether governmental agencies are exercising a consistent approach
to this problem.

